

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

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“Terrorism is an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons”, Alex Schmid & Berto Jongman, Academic Consensus Definition (22 core elements), 1988.

“given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization”, EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, Article 1, 2002.

“[t]errorism is theatre” – “Terrorists like to see a lot of people watching, not a lot of people

dead”, Brian Jenkins, 1975.

Weinberg, Pedahzur, Hirsch-Hoefler , The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.16, No.4 (Winter 2004), pp.777–794

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/095465590899768>

	Element	Schmid/Jongman Survey 1988	Weinberg/Pedahzur/Hirsh- Hoefler Survey 2004
1	Violence, Force	83.5	71
2	Political	65	60
3	Fear, Terror emphasized	51	22
4	Threat	47	41
5	Psychological effects and anticipated reactions	41.5	5.5
6	Victim-target differentiation	37.5	25
7	Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32	11
8	Method of combat, strategy, tactic	30.5	31.5
9	Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints	30	0
10	Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28	5.5
11	Publicity aspect	21.5	18
12	Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscrimination	21	0
13	Civilians, non-combatants, neutral, outsiders as victims	17.5	22
14	Intimidation	17	11
15	Innocence of victims emphasized	15.5	10
16	Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14	29
17	Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13.5	5.5
18	Clandestine, covert nature	9	7
19	Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9	1
20	Repetitiveness, serial or campaign of violence	7	0
21	Criminal	6	5.5
22	Demands made on third parties	4	1

Alex Schmid , The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism, Vol 6, No 2 (2012)

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-terrorism-definition/html>

1. *Terrorism refers, on the one hand, to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of*

calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties;

2. Terrorism as a tactic is employed in *three main contexts*: (i) illegal state repression, (ii) propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in times of peace or outside zones of conflict and (iii) as an illicit tactic of irregular warfare employed by state- and non-state actors;

3. The *physical violence* or threat thereof employed by terrorist actors involves single-phase acts of lethal violence (such as bombings and armed assaults), dual- phased life-threatening incidents (like kidnapping, hijacking and other forms of hostage-taking for coercive bargaining) as well as multi-phased sequences of actions (such as in ‘disappearances’ involving kidnapping, secret detention, torture and murder).

4. The public (-ized) terrorist victimization initiates *threat-based communication processes* whereby, on the one hand, conditional demands are made to individuals, groups, governments, societies or sections thereof, and, on the other hand, the support of specific constituencies (based on ties of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and the like) is sought by the terrorist perpetrators;

5. At the origin of terrorism stands *terror* – instilled fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety – spread among those identifying, or sharing similarities, with the direct victims, generated by some of the modalities of the terrorist act – its shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules of warfare and the rules of punishment;

6. The main *direct victims* of terrorist attacks are in general not any armed forces but are *usually civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenceless persons* who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict that gave rise to acts of terrorism;

7. The *direct victims are not the ultimate target* (as in a classical assassination where victim and target coincide) but serve as message generators, more or less unwittingly helped by the news values of the mass media, to reach various audiences and conflict parties that identify either with the victims’ plight or the terrorists’ professed cause;

8. Sources of terrorist violence can be individual *perpetrators*, small groups, diffuse transnational networks as well as state actors or state-sponsored clandestine agents (such as death squads and hit teams);

9. While showing similarities with methods employed by organized crime as well as those found in war crimes, terrorist violence is *predominantly political* – usually in its motivation but nearly always in its societal repercussions;

10. The immediate *intent* of acts of terrorism is to terrorize, intimidate, antagonize, disorientate, destabilize, coerce, compel, demoralize or provoke a target population or conflict party in the hope of achieving from the resulting insecurity a favourable power outcome, e.g. obtaining publicity, extorting ransom money, submission to terrorist demands and/or mobilizing or immobilizing sectors of the public;

11. The *motivations* to engage in terrorism cover a broad range, including redress for alleged grievances, personal or vicarious revenge, collective punishment, revolution, national liberation and the promotion of diverse ideological, political, social, national or religious causes and objectives;

12: Acts of terrorism rarely standalone but form part of a *campaign* of violence which alone can, due to the serial character of acts of violence and threats of more to come, create a pervasive climate of fear that enables the terrorists to manipulate the political process.

It should say something about a <i>doctrine</i> and/or <i>practice</i> of violent action	It should refer to the <i>context</i> in which terrorism is employed as a tactic	It should contain the concept of <i>physical violence</i> or threat thereof	It should say something about <i>threat-based communication processes</i>
It should mention that terrorism instills <i>fear, dread, panic or mere anxiety</i>	It should say something about the <i>direct victims</i>	It should point at the fact that the <i>direct victims are not the ultimate target</i>	It should say something about the <i>perpetrators</i>
It should mention that terrorism is <i>predominantly political</i>	It should refer to the <i>intent</i> of acts of terrorism	It should contain the <i>motivations to engage in terrorism</i>	It should mention that terrorist acts form part of a <i>campaign of violence</i>

Council of Europe, Actions against terrorism

http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/4_theme_files/country_profiles/default_en.asp

EU List of Terrorists & Terrorist organization, 07/26/2013

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:201:0057:0059:EN:PDF>

US Department of State, Foreign Terrorists Organizations

<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>

Europol, TE-SAT 2014 –European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2014-european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2014>

John Horgan, **Deradicalization or Disengagement?**, vol.2 No. 4, 2008

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/32/html>

There is no evidence to suggest that *disengagement* from terrorism may result in *deradicalization*.

Unverified and often spurious claims to success by the proponents of some of these programmes does not mean that we should dismiss their claims, rather we should engage in efforts to ask one of the most basic questions in all counterterrorism: do they actually *work* (and *why?*)

Definition of deradicalization, John Horgan: “*social and psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity*”.

Angel Rabasa, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, RAND, 2010

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf

A person could exit a radical organization and refrain from violence but nevertheless retain a radical worldview. Deradicalization is the process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values.

Leaving an ideologically based radical Islamist group is not the same as leaving a criminal group or a gang, an essentially non-ideological entity.

The ostensibly good track record of some programs can be misleading because these efforts focus on reforming terrorist sympathizers and supporters, not hard-core militants. This has become increasingly apparent in light of the number of Saudi Guantanamo detainees who have returned to terrorism upon their release.

Since these nations [Middle Eastern and Southeast Asia] (with the exception of Singapore) have explicitly Islamic governments or are Muslim-majority countries, the government is willing to become involved in

matters of religious interpretation to promote an official version of Islam.

Collective deradicalization has occurred infrequently—only when a state has defeated an extremist organization by killing or imprisoning most of the group's leaders.

Most European states have been very reluctant to become involved in religious matters and therefore do not directly challenge the extremist ideology [...], emphasized policies aimed at countering radicalization by enhancing social cohesion and the integration of their Muslim populations. [...] It is not clear that simply promoting democratic and national values, which is the approach that some European governments have taken, is sufficient to ward off radicalization.

Deradicalization programs cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region. They have to develop organically in a specific country and culture.

Disengagement and deradicalization programs will likely remain a necessary part of larger counter-radicalization and counterterrorism strategies. However, governments cannot afford to be naïve or careless when seeking to rehabilitate extremists. To succeed, deradicalization programs must be extensive efforts that include affective, pragmatic, and ideological components and considerable aftercare.

Deradicalization programs, in particular, need to exercise caution, carefully evaluating each individual before release and implementing safeguards, such as monitoring, to protect against the eventuality that former militants could once again take up arms.

RAND, How Terrorist Groups End, 2008


http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9351/index1.html

religiously motivated terrorist groups took longer to eliminate than other groups but rarely achieved their objectives; no religiously motivated group achieved victory during the period studied.

size significantly determined a group's fate. Groups exceeding 10,000 members were victorious more than 25 percent of the time, while victory was rare for groups below 1,000 members.

terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be motivated by religion.

How 268 Terrorist Groups Worldwide Ended, 1968–2006



Definition and Essence of Terrorism

Bruce, Gregor. 'Definition of Terrorism – Social and Political Effects', *Journal of Military and Veterans' Health*, vol. 21, no. 2. (May 2013)

<http://jmvh.org/article/definitionof-terrorism-social-and-political-effects/>

Rapoport, David, C. 'Four Waves or Rebel Terror and September 11', *Antropoethics*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002)

<http://www.anthropoethics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror.htm>

In the 1880s, an initial "Anarchist Wave"⁽⁶⁾ appeared which continued for some 40 years. Its successor, the "Anti-Colonial Wave" began in the 1920s, and by the 1960s had largely disappeared. The late 1960s witnessed the birth of the "New Left Wave," which dissipated largely in the 90s leaving a few groups still active in Sri Lanka, Spain, France, Peru, and Columbia. The fourth or "Religious Wave" began in 1979, and, if it follows the pattern of its predecessors, it still has twenty to twenty-five years to run.

Sinai, Joshua. 'How to Define Terrorism', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. II, no. 4 (2008)

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/33/67>

Researching Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Disciplines: **political science**, military science, international relations, communication studies, social-psychology, conflict study, administrative law, police studies, ...

Academic approaches: rational or instrumental (Martha Crenshaw), socio-psychological (Jerrold Post), multi-causal (Edwin Bakker)

Corte, Luis de La. 'Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2007)

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/8/18>

There are three approaches to studying terrorism: macro-sociological, psychological, and **psychosocial**

1. First psychosocial principle: terrorism must not be seen as a syndrome but as a method of social and political influence
2. Second principle: the attributes of terrorists are shaped by processes of social interaction
3. Third principle: terrorist organizations can be analyzed by analogy with other social movements
4. Fourth principle: terrorism only is possible when terrorists have access to certain resources
5. Fifth principle: the decision to begin and sustain a terrorist campaign is always legitimized by an extreme ideology
6. Sixth principle: every terrorist campaign involves strategic goals but the rationality which terrorists apply to their violence is imperfect
7. Seventh principle: the activity of terrorists partly reflects the internal features of their organizations

Schmid, Alex. '50 Un- and Under-researched Topics in the Field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2011)

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-under-researched-topics>

1. Terrorist audiences and their responses: cross-national and longitudinal comparisons of public opinion surveys regarding support of, and opposition to, terrorism;
2. Measuring and evaluating counter-terrorism policies: methodologies and techniques;
3. Unwanted and unexpected side- and boomerang (blowback) effects of counter-terrorism: ways to recognize and minimize them;
4. Is there a disconnect between academic research on terrorism and the counter-terrorist intelligence community's knowledge (and knowledge requirements) regarding terrorism?;
5. Review of national terrorism prevention programs and policies in a comparative perspective;
6. De-mobilisation of guerrilla and terrorist groups: best practices and lessons learned;
7. Non-violent popular revolt and Salafist Jihadism: competing paradigms for political change in the Islamic world;
8. Conspiracy theories related to (counter-) terrorism: is there a need for countering them?
9. Warning the public: responsible crisis communications prior, during and after terrorist attacks - lessons learned and best practices;
10. Strengthening public resilience against terrorism: policies of individual states (e.g. Israel, Colombia, USA);
11. New strategies for identifying and countering extremist ideologies on the Internet;
12. Countering terrorism: is it possible to limit the role of government and strengthen the role of civil society?;
13. Civil society and (counter-) terrorism: the role of NGOs in terrorism and counter-terrorism;
14. Immigration, diasporas and terrorism: misperceptions, alleged and proven links;
15. The responses of human rights organizations to human rights violations by terrorist groups.
16. Counter-terrorism within the frameworks of human rights and humanitarian law requirements: upholding or updating international law standards?
17. The UN CT strategy [GA Res. 60/288 (2006)]: where does the international community stand with its implementation?
18. Terrorism and the Media, Terrorism and the Internet: cross-impacts and what can be done about them while upholding freedom of speech and expression?
19. Freedom of speech vs. incitement to terrorism: the response of the courts;
20. Prevention of terrorism by intelligence and security services vs. prosecution and punishment of terrorists by law enforcement: dilemmas and solutions;
21. The prosecution of terrorists in international comparison: national arrest, trial and conviction records compared;
22. The grievances of terrorists: should they be taken seriously or are they just pretexts and justifications for violence?
23. The terrorism - organized crime nexus: new insights and developments;
24. The delayed impact of the 2008 economic crisis on terrorism, political violence, armed conflict and non-violent protests;
25. The rehabilitation of terrorists vs. the rehabilitation of common criminals in prison: recidivism records compared;
26. Prisons: new ways of preventing and countering radicalization of prisoners and advancing rehabilitation of convicted offenders;
27. Countering radicalisation and violent extremism in schools and religious institutions: evaluating existing programs;
28. The shrinking space of citizen privacy: thinking about safeguards to prevent the development of surveillance societies in the name of counter-terrorism;
29. Islamophobia and Antisemitism compared: between rhetorical weapons and legitimate grievances;
30. Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and Buddhists under attack for their faith: a quantitative comparison in the post-Cold War period – claims vs. facts;
31. Differentiating between terrorism, other forms of political violence and human rights violations: towards a more balanced approach to assessing armed conflict and repression;
32. Analyzing terrorist statements and internal writings: looking for cues regarding the expected utility of terrorism in terrorist thinking;

33. Measuring the actual effectiveness of terrorism: findings from empirical research on the tactical and strategic outcomes of uses of terrorism;
34. State human rights violations in response to terrorism – how widespread, how serious?;
35. Kidnapping for ransom: the consequences of paying ransom and of refusals to pay.
36. The messaging policies of Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and media jihadists: analyzing communiques and threat statements systematically;
37. Careers of ex-terrorists and their role in countering terrorism;
38. Terrorists released from prison: subsequent careers;
39. The targeting logic of terrorist attacks;
40. The trajectory of terrorist campaigns in comparative perspective;
41. The role of victim associations in court cases against terrorists;
42. Websites associated with terrorist groups: an overview;
43. Failed, foiled and completed attacks by Al-Qaeda, AQ affiliates and individual (would-be) associates: a consolidated overview;
44. New legislation on terrorism: inventory, comparison and impact;
45. The lethality of terrorism in comparison with criminal homicides, victimization by natural disasters, specific diseases, etc.: towards a realistic ranking of human risks;
46. Pakistan: regional and global implications of potential state failure/collapse;
47. Afghanistan: endgame scenarios and their regional and global implications;
48. The Arab Awakening and its possible implications for terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation;
49. Terrorist groups and political parties - same goals, different tactics: between cooperation and rivalry;
50. The future of terrorism: regional trends, new developments, likely scenarios and worst (CBRN) cases.

Schuurman, Bart and Quirine Eijkman. *Moving Terrorism Research Forward: The Crucial Role of Primary Sources*, ICCT Policy Brief, June 2013

<http://www.icct.nl/publications/icct-papers/moving-terrorism-research-forward-the-crucial-role-of-primary-sources>

“[T]here are probably few areas [...] where so much is written on the basis of so little research”

Explaining the Scarcity of Primary Sources

The violent and secretive nature of terrorism presents researchers with several practical obstacles when it comes to conducting empirical research.

Examples of primary sources-driven research on terrorism

- Defining the psychological characteristics of suicide bombers
- Examining homegrown jihadism in Australia using wire taps & interviews
- Understanding the escalation of violence through field work in Asia and South America
- Exploring patterns of behaviour of jihadist terrorists using court records
- Empirically-driven research on terrorism in Indonesia
- An empirical analysis of the Dutch prison system’s “terrorism wing”
- Studying jihadi terrorism in the Netherlands using police files
- Using multiple sources to study jihad in Europe

A lack of research based on primary sources has been one of the major impediments to progress in the field of (counter-)terrorism studies. Although the difficulties involved in gaining access to such sources makes their scarcity understandable, efforts should be made both by academics and policymakers to address this deficiency. As numerous leading experts have warned, the consequences of an overreliance on secondary sources of information, such as newspapers, has led to a great amount of theorising based on a perilously small empirical foundation. Detailed and reliable primary data, such as interviews and government archives, are vital if we are to truly advance our understanding of terrorism: from its causes and precipitating dynamics to the best ways to counter or prevent it.

These concerns affect policymakers, politicians, government agencies as well as private companies involved in counter-terrorism. They are no less reliant on accurate and reliable information on terrorism

than researchers. As several of the examples of primary-sources driven research have suggested, governments are increasingly aware of this and are making greater efforts to provide researchers with access to data on terrorism. Counter-terrorism practitioners are also becoming more sensitive to the fact that academic research can be a valuable asset in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, as the examples discussed in this background note highlight, despite various obstacles, obtaining primary data through fieldwork and interviews is certainly feasible. Hopefully this trend towards a greater use of primary sources will continue into the future and provide new avenues for advancing the study of (counter-)terrorism.

Five Assumptions on Terrorism


Abrahms, Max. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work", *International Security* vol. 31, no.2 (2006), pp.42-78

<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2006.31.2.42>

Groups whose attacks on civilian targets outnumbered attacks on military targets systematically failed to achieve their policy objectives, regardless of their nature.

Guerrilla groups, by definition, mostly attack military and diplomatic targets, such as military assets, diplomatic personnel, and police forces. CCTGs [civilian-centric terrorist groups], on the other hand, primarily attack innocent bystanders and businesses.

CCTGs never accomplished their policy goals, even when they were limited, ambiguous, or idiosyncratic.



Bakker, Edwin. *Jihadi terrorists in Europe, their characteristics and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad: an exploratory study*, (Clingendael Institute: 2006)

http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf

Social Background

- Geographical origins
- Socioeconomic status
- Education
- Faith as youth
- Occupation
- Family status

Psychological make-up

- Mental illness
- Terrorist personality

Circumstances of joining the jihad

- Age
- Place of recruitment
- Faith
- Employment
- Relative deprivation
- Friendship
- Kinship
- Discipleship
- Worship

The large majority of the individuals [172 global salafi jihadis terrorists] examined were married and most had children. Yet they were willing to sacrifice themselves and others for the cause.

The terrorists in his sample did not display any psychiatric pathology. He did not observe a pattern of emotional trauma in their past or any evidence of any pathological hatred or paranoia. Regarding social psychology, Sageman concluded that judging from their backgrounds, individuals did not suffer from long-term relative deprivation or from pathological prejudice.

Sageman found that most of the global mujahedin had strong occupational skills. However, few were employed full-time when they joined the jihad. In the eyes of Sageman, this underemployment must have been a definite grievance and a source of frustration in these generally gifted individuals. These were, however, temporary circumstances just before their joining the jihad, rather than a structural relative deprivation in their original backgrounds.

There exist common patterns. *“Just before they joined the jihad, the prospective mujahedin were socially and spiritually alienated and probably in some form of distress.”* Analyzing the joining of the jihad by the 172 terrorists, he rejects the common notions of recruitment and brainwashing to account for this process. Instead, he argues for a three-prong process: social affiliation with the jihad accomplished through friendship, kinship and discipleship; progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the global Salafi jihad ideology; and formal acceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to the global Salafi network. Sageman concludes that social bonds are the crucial element in this process.

Social and personal characteristics, Situational characteristics:

Jihadi terrorist networks in Europe tend to form around people who share age group, country of family origins, and the country in which they live

	Bakker (Europe)	Sageman (Global)
pool	242	172
sex	Male: 98% Female: 2%	Male: 100%
geographical background	family origin: 5% European, 95% Arabic (26 countries) country in which people were raised: majority born in Europe place of residence: 97% (8 European countries) nationalities: 40% Europeans, 60% Arabic countries, dual citizenships (29 nationalities)	Global Mainly from Saudi, Morocco, France

socioeconomic background	Upper class: 4% Middle class: 42% Lower class: 54% (immigrant)	Upper class: 10% Middle class: 33% Lower class: 16%
education	Basic education: 13% Secondary education: 56% College/university: 31%	University: 31%
faith as youth	Christian converted: 26% Hindu converted: 2% Secular: 50% Religious family: 22%	Secular: 49%
occupation	Unskilled: 33% Semi-skilled: 18% Skilled: 12% Shop keepers: 12% Student: 17% Unemployed: 15%	Skilled pro: 43% Unskilled: 90% (in Maghreb only) Unemployed: 10%
family status	Married/engaged: 59% Divorced: 12% Having children: 38% Single: 33%	Married: most of them Having children: most of them
criminal records	25%	25%
psychological explanations	Mental illness: 5%	Mental illness: 1%
age	Youngest: 16 Oldest: 59 Average: 27	Average: 26
place of recruitment	Europe: 87% Arabic countries: 13% Country of residence: 80%	Foreign country: 70%
faith	Faith increased quickly: 95%	Faith increased quickly: most
employment	Full time: 62% Part-time: 20% Jobless: 18%	Full-time: many Students: many
relative deprivation	Deprivation: 10% (not enough data)	n/a
social affiliation	Friends: 18% Kinship: 21%	Friendship: 87% Discipleship: few
formal acceptance	Few cases of connection to Salafist networks	Importance of formal acceptance

Mostly single males that are born and raised in Europe; they are not particularly young; they are often from the lower strata of society; and many of them have a criminal record. Their socioeconomic background and their often tainted criminal history are reflective of many youngsters in immigrant Muslim communities in Europe, to which most of them belong. Given the fact that more than 40 percent of them were born in Europe and an additional 55 percent have been raised in European countries or are long-term residents, the label 'home-grown' is very appropriate to this group. If we look at the circumstances in which these individuals became involved in jihadi terrorist activities, a picture emerges of networks including friends or relatives that do not seem to have formal ties with global Salafi networks; that radicalize with little outside interference; and that do so in the country in which they live, often together with family members or friends.

Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Malecková. 'Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?', *NBER Working Paper No. 9074* (July 2002)

<http://www.nber.org/papers/w9074>

This literature finds that the occurrence of hate crimes is largely independent of economic conditions.

Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or ignorance, we suggest it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics.

Having a standard of living above the poverty line or a secondary-school education or higher is positively associated with participation in Hezbollah.

Hassan's observations about suicide bombers: None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from what is now Israel. Two were the sons of millionaires.

Educated, middle or upper class individuals are better suited to carry out acts of international terrorism than are impoverished illiterates because the terrorists must fit into a foreign environment to be successful.

To use education as part of a strategy to reduce terrorism, the international community should not limit itself to increasing years of schooling but should consider the content of education.

Piazza, James A. 'Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous?: An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure', *Terrorism and Political Violence* vol. 21, no.1 (2009), pp. 62-88

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550802544698#.UlrLHNImU68>

Gary LaFree, The Global Terrorism Database: Accomplishments and Challenges', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 4, no. 1 (2010)

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/89/html>

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). *Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later*, 2011

http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/BackgroundReport_10YearsSince9_11.pdf

Five Assumptions on Counter-Terrorism

Jones, Seth and Martin Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Implications for Countering Al Qaeda* | RAND, (RAND Corporation: 2008), pp 1-45

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf

The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame achieved victory.

The ending of most terrorist groups requires a range of policy instruments, such as careful police and intelligence work, military force, political negotiations, and economic sanctions. This may be because



security forces captured or killed most of its members, the group reached a peace agreement with the government, its members shifted to nonviolent means to achieve their goals, or its members splintered to join other groups or start new ones. There are at least five major ways in which terrorist groups end: policing, military force, splintering, politics, or victory.

Following an examination of 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, we found that a transition to the political process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended (43 percent). Our quantitative analysis looked at groups that have ended since 1968 or are still active. It yielded several other interesting findings:

- Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups. Approximately 62 percent of all terrorist groups have ended since 1968, but only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended.
- Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives. No religious group that has ended achieved victory since 1968.
- Size is a significant determinant of a group's fate. Big groups of more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25 percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller than 1,000 members.
- There is no statistical correlation between the duration of a terrorist group and ideological motivation, economic conditions, regime type, or the breadth of terrorist goals. But there appears to be some correlation between the size of a terrorist group and duration: Larger groups tend to last longer than smaller groups.
- When a terrorist group becomes involved in an insurgency, it does not end easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time, groups ended by negotiating a settlement with the government; 25 percent of the time, they achieved victory; and 19 percent of the time, military forces defeated them.
- Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be motivated by religion
-

Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors.

Poor economic conditions may heighten grievances, which provide a more supportive environment for terrorist groups and increase their longevity. Grievances are difficult to measure independently of terrorism, but measures of average levels of discrimination are feasible. Some argue that greater economic inequality creates broad grievances that favor terrorism.



Jordan, Jenna. 'When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation', *Security Studies* vol. 18, no. 4 (2009), pp.719–755, (Clingendael Institute: 2006)

<http://d3qi0qp55mx5f5.cloudfront.net/cpost/i/docs/Jordan-When-Heads-Roll.pdf>

Both academics and policy makers have argued that the removal of leaders is an effective strategy in combating terrorism. However, leadership decapitation is not always successful

The data [298 incidents of leadership targeting from 1945–2004] show that a group's age, size, and type are critical in identifying when decapitation will cause the cessation of terrorist activity.

Ideological organizations are most likely to experience a cessation of activity following the removal of leader, while religious organizations are highly resistant to leadership decapitation.

The data show that decapitation does not increase the likelihood of organizational collapse beyond a baseline rate of collapse for groups over time. Organizations that have not had their leaders removed are more likely to fall apart than those that have undergone a loss of leadership. The marginal utility of decapitation is negative for many groups, particularly for larger, older, religious, and separatist organizations. The data also show that decapitation is not an effective counterterrorism strategy.

It seems plausible that terrorist organizations, which are also classified as cults, would be more susceptible to collapse than others.

In cases where there is overlap between the leader and the hub, decapitation should weaken a decentralized organization.[...] decentralized organizations are much harder to weaken than hierarchical organizations.

The statistical data suggest that organizational age, type, and size are key in identifying when an organization is susceptible to decapitation. Younger and smaller organizations are more likely to cease activity after the removal of a leader. Religious organizations are resilient to decapitation while ideological organizations are more susceptible to collapse.

Impact of Typology on Organizational Fate			
	Separatist	Religious	Ideological
Remained Active	125	111	80
Collapsed	15 10.71%	5 4.31%	39 32.77%

Removing both the upper echelon and the leader should severely hinder the ability of an organization to coordinate and to carry out an activity.[...] removing the top leader as apposed members of the upper echelon is more effective in killing an organization.

Impact of Leadership and Decapitation Type on Group Fate				
	Leader Killed	Leader Arrested	Upper Echelon	Upper Echelon
Remained Active	36 69.23%	55 78.57%	67 93.06%	88 84.62%
Collapsed	16 30.77%	15 21.43%	5 6.94%	16 15.38%

Arrest was more effective in the case of the upper echelon, while killing the top leader was more effective than arresting the top leader.

Probability of Organizational Collapse After Decapitation				
	Young	Old	Small	Large
Religious	5%	.8%	5%	2%
Ideological	39%	8%	39%	18%
Separatist	24%	4%	25%	9%

First, decapitation has been most successful against younger organizations. Second, the weakness of ideological organizations is apparent when looking at age as well. Young ideological organizations are easier to destabilize than religious or separatist organizations. Older ideological organizations are much more resilient than young organizations. Age and organizational type are the two strongest predictors of when decapitation will be successful.

Decapitation is less effective against larger groups. The smallest organizations were highly susceptible for collapse.

Decapitation is actually counterproductive against large, old, and religious groups. [...] Decapitation is not an effective counterterrorism strategy and that older groups are more difficult to destabilize. [...] Decapitation is more effective against small organizations.

While decapitation does not seem to have a consistent effect on the number of incidents, attacks generally became more deadly in the years immediately following decapitation. [...] After continual decapitations Hamas carried out more, but less lethal, attacks. [...] Decapitation seems to have little effect upon the ability of FARC to inflict damage. [...] Decapitation seems to have counterproductive consequences in religious and separatist organizations. [...] Going after the leader may strengthen a group's resolve, result in retaliatory attacks, increase public sympathy for the organization, or produce more lethal attacks.

Price, Bryan C. 'Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism', *International Security* vol. 4, no. 36 (2012), pp. 9-46

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21915/targeting_top_terrorists.htm

Because terrorist leaders know that they live and die by the sword, they hesitate to provide subordinates with the knowledge and skills to run the organization in their place.

The violent, clandestine, and values-based nature of terrorist groups makes them particularly susceptible to leadership decapitation. Each of these three organizational characteristics implies the importance of leaders and makes leadership succession problematic. In combination, they produce a potent synergistic effect that increases their susceptibility to decapitation

Terrorist groups that experienced the loss of a leader had higher mortality rates than those that did not. Depending on how I modeled the effect of decapitation, terrorist groups were 3.6 to 6.7 times more likely to end than those that did not experience decapitation.

Terrorist groups with allies are up to 52 percent less likely to end than groups without them, and 39 percent less likely to end if they are competing with rival terrorist groups.

The more time a state requires to remove a terrorist leader, the less impact leadership decapitation will have on the group's mortality rate.

Smaller groups seem to behave no differently than larger groups when their leaders are killed or captured. Compared to nationalist groups, religious groups are almost 77 percent less likely to suffer organizational death. When a religious group suffers the loss of its leader, however, it is almost five times more likely to end than are nationalist groups.

Terrorist groups are susceptible to decapitation because they have unique organizational characteristics (they are violent, clandestine, and values-based organizations) that amplify the importance of leaders and make leadership succession difficult.

Killing or capturing a terrorist leader increased the mortality rate of the group. There is no guarantee, however, that organizational death will be immediate; only 30 percent of decapitated groups (40 of 131) ended within two years of losing their leader. [...] The earlier leadership decapitation occurs in a terrorist group's life cycle, the greater the effect it will have on the group's mortality rate. Additionally, the magnitude of this effect decreases over time. [...] Group size does not affect terrorist group duration. Smaller groups are just as durable as larger groups, and groups of different size react similarly after losing a leader. [...] Religious terrorist groups were less resilient and easier to destroy than nationalist groups following leadership decapitation.

I argue that scholars should not rely on “silver bullet” metrics—for example, whether a group experiences organizational collapse within two years after leadership decapitation—to evaluate counterterrorism policies (p5) / I considered a group inactive if two years passed without a violent attack, with the year of the group's last attack serving as its end date (p19) / I chose this two-year time horizon so that I could compare my findings with those from Jordan's empirical tests, which examined the probability of a group ending within two years after a decapitation (p29).

Dealing With Terrorism & The Future

Bakker, Edwin and Beatrice de Graaf. *Towards a Theory of Fear Management in the Counter-Terrorism Domain*, ICCT Research Paper, January 2014

<http://www.icct.nl/publications/icct-papers/towards-a-theory-of-fear-management-in-the-counter-terrorism-domain>

The impact of any terrorist activity is the product of the perception, imagination and vulnerability of targeted audiences or otherwise involved parties.

Fear of terrorism can lead to radicalization on both sides, and even towards more terrorism.

[Resilience] indicates the capacity of materials, persons or biotopes to resist sudden changes or stress, as well as the capacity to recover and return to the situation as before. [...] resilient society is able to (more efficiently) cope with and to recover from a terrorist attack. Terrorists who attack a resilient society will find it more difficult to have an impact and achieve their goals.

Coping mechanisms are individual mechanisms, mainly operating through personal psychological functions.

People do not want to be mere victims or bystanders, but generally express a desire to be able and willing to do something, or at least to do the right thing and not to play into the hands of the perpetrators. Triggering these positive coping mechanisms will increase a population's resilience and can further help to reduce the chance of excessive fear, overreactions and tensions in the event of a terrorist attack.

Bakker, Edwin. 'Forecasting Terrorism: The Need for a More Systematic Approach', *Journal of Strategic Security*, vol. 5, no. 4 (2012), (Clingendael Institute: 2006)

<http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1209&context=jss>

The failure of imagination was the most important missed opportunity

Between 2000 and 2012 is that there is no general consensus on the future of terrorism, and that there is a lot of room for improvement in the methodology and research.

Furedi, Frank. 'Who's afraid of the big bad 'lone wolf'?', *Spiked*, February 2012

<http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/12138>

The impact made by terrorism is determined in large part by our response to it.

Lone wolf: an individual malcontent with no connection to any organized group, someone who is entirely off the radar; indeed, someone who could be anyone.

Livingstone, Ken. 'Text of statement by Mayor Ken Livingstone', *Financial Times* (July 7, 2005)

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/dcdfef116-ef08-11d9-8b10-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3B84ENBrS>

Making Headlines Today - Foreign Fighters

Barrett, Richard. *Foreign Fighters in Syria*, The Soufan Group, June 2014

<http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf>

The Syrian war is therefore likely to be an incubator for a new generation of terrorists.

A returning fighter will have a great deal of credibility in radical circles at home, and if he argues against participation in the war, and against the al-Qaeda narrative more generally, this is likely to be more effective than anything a government can do.

Malet, David. 'Foreign Fighters Playbook: What the Texas Revolution and Spanish Civil War Reveal about Al Qaeda', *Foreign Affairs*, April 8, 2014

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141107/david-malet/foreign-fighters-playbook>

Fighting for what is often an abstract ideal, without having to worry about direct retaliation against their families, the foreign fighters need not show mercy.

Insurgent groups, from the Texan Army in 1836 to al Qaeda affiliates in Syria today, use despair rather than optimism to recruit members.

Governments are right to worry about radicalization, but militants who return home are also likely to bring with them tales of disillusionment that could effectively blunt recruitment programs.

Hegghammer, Thomas. 'Syria's Foreign Fighters', *Foreign Policy*, December 9, 2013

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/09/syrias-foreign-fighters/>

The foreign fighter flow into Syria looks set to extend the life of the jihadi movement by a generation.

The norm creates a general inclination to support "fellow Muslims in need" and helps explain many aspects of Muslim politics, from the large size of the Muslim charitable sector to the near-universal support for the Palestinian cause.

Syria attracts more foreign fighters not despite, but *because* of its sectarian features.

It is easier for Sunni Islamists to legitimize jihad against an Alawite regime than against a Sunni one.

Poorly policed, the web is a very powerful instrument of mobilization, because it transmits information (such as propaganda or practical advice) fast, far, and cheaply.

Record numbers of foreign fighters are going to Syria because they can.

Preventive measures may include information campaigns aimed at families of at-risk youth, targeted outreach to prospective recruits, and the blocking of particularly obvious "travel advice" websites. **Obstructive measures** may include requiring parental consent for foreign travel for people under a certain age, or the confiscation of passports of people returning from Syria with documented links to the most radical groups. **Penal measures** may include the withholding of social security benefits for people known to have gone to Syria, the prosecution of recruiters and facilitators within supplier countries, and the prosecution of people who return from Syria having committed unlawful acts of violence.

Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine de and Edwin Bakker, 'Returning Western foreign fighters: The case of Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia', *ICCT Background Note*, June 2014


<http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-De-Roy-van-Zuijdewijn-Bakker-Returning-Western-Foreign-Fighters-June-2014.pdf>

Violent "lesser jihad" has a long history in Islam.

Many foreign fighters were upper-middle class Arab men that knew more about engineering and business than fighting

While these examples prove that a number of foreign fighters from Afghanistan indeed returned and, in some cases, posed a threat to their country, a larger number of foreign fighters stayed in Afghanistan or continued their fight elsewhere, many of them in Bosnia.

Many of the foreign fighters who returned had grown disillusioned with the cause and were not involved in terrorist attacks in their country. Some were, however, involved in terrorist activities elsewhere.



Weggemans, Daan, Edwin Bakker and Peter Grol, 'Who Are They and Why Do They Go? The Radicalisation and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters', *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 8, no. 4 (2014)

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/365/718>

De Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine. "The Foreign Fighters' Threat: What History Can(not) Tell Us", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 8, no. 5 (2014)

<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/378>

Essay #1: Oklahoma Bombing

The Oklahoma City Bombing was perpetrated on the morning of April 19, 1995 by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. At 9:02am McVeigh detonated the artisanal bomb he created with fertilizer and diesel fuel, located in his truck placed in front of the Federal Building. More than 300 buildings and numerous cars around were damaged due to the deflagration of the bomb. 168 persons, including 19 children were murdered and a few hundreds injured. [1].

McVeigh was indicted with 11 counts and found guilty by a jury on June 2, 1997 and then, sentenced to death [2]. In the Grand Jury Indictment [3], the eleven counts are Conspiracy to Use and use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction, Destruction by Explosive and First Degree Murder. The word “terrorist” or “terrorism” does appear in neither any legal aforementioned documents, nor in the posterior appellate decided in October 5, 1998 [4].

In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, AEDPA, was enacted “*to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes*”[5]. The Office of Justice Program got the AEDPA amended by the Congress to access the emergency reserve funds in both domestic and international terrorist incidents, “*as a result of the need for federal monetary assistance to victims of the Oklahoma City bombing*”[8].

In the brief of the United States opposing stay of execution on June 4, 2001, the term “terrorism” seems to appear for the first time in a judicial document in reference to the AEDPA [6]. The stay of execution was denied.

McVeigh was executed on June 11, 2011.

Although the scarcity of the usage of the terms referring to terrorism in the judicial documents, this term was however used abundantly in the media, articles and probably in the court room: in their famous cases, the FBI references this case as “*the worst act of homegrown terrorism in the nation’s history*”[1], or the Washington Post announcing the verdict “*Timothy J. McVeigh was convicted today of the worst act of domestic terrorism in American history*”[7] as well as citing the Federal Prosecutor presented McVeigh as a *domestic terrorist*. The Global Terrorism Database also references this act under the identification 199504190004. The Oklahoma Bombing event was used as a ground to enact further laws like the AEDPA[5,8] related to domestic terrorism, posterior to the event.

McVeigh decided to take some action against the Federal Government in response of his grievance for the government’s siege of Waco, Texas in 1993. He intended and was willing to cause a general uprising in the USA by blowing up the federal building in downtown Oklahoma city, on the anniversary date of the end of the siege. He rationalized the inevitable loss of lives, believing that anyone working in the building would be guilty by association to the event which

occurred in Waco[2]. The brief exposure of the context explained by USA v. McVeigh[2] highlights the ten out of twelve following points from Schmid Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism [9], in relationship with the motives, methods and aftermath of the criminal activities. There was no alleged “*threat-based communication process*” and the act was blatantly standalone perpetrated by an apprehended lone wolf, therefore avoiding an escalation into a “*campaign of violence*”.

- “*Doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of fear-generating and coercive political violence, and direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians for psychological effects on audiences*”
- “*tactic employed in propagandistic agitation by non-state actors in time of piece or outside a zone of conflict*”
- “*the physical violence involves single-phase acts of lethal violence*”
- “*instilled fear, shocking brutality, lack of discrimination, dramatic or symbolic quality and disregard of the rules*”
- “*the direct victims are defenseless non-combatants who bear no direct responsibility for the conflict*”
- “*direct victims are not the ultimate targets but serve as message generator to reach various audience*”
- “*source of violence can be individual perpetrators*”
- “*similarities found in war crimes, violence is predominantly political*”
- “*immediate intent is to provoke a target population in the hope of achieving a favorable power outcome*”
- “*motivations cover redress for alleged grievance and personal revenge*”:

In sum, although McVeigh was portrayed in the media and in the courtroom as a domestic terrorist, he was not indicted under any US law regarding terrorism, but as a first degree murderer who used weapon of mass destruction. This event helped enacting the AEDPA law and voting special funds. Oklahoma Federal Building bombing appears to satisfy the elements of terrorism from Schmid consensus of 2012: such event might be prosecuted nowadays under more severe and straightforward laws regarding terrorism, and helped in a sense by providing a ground and precedents to tackle homegrown terrorism.

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<http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/schmid-terrorism-definition/html>

Essay #2: Suicide terrorists are not crazy

The origins of the claims that “[modern] terrorists, even suicide bombers, are not psychotics or fanatics; they’re rational actors”[1] may be attributed to Robert Pape, Professor of Political Sciences at the university of Chicago[4]. Pape concluded after having analyses 350 suicide attacks between 1980 and 2004 that “suicide terrorism follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions.”[3,5]. “The modern age of suicide terrorism can be said to have begun with Hezbollah’s attack, in October of 1983, on U.S. marines who were sleeping in their barracks in Beirut”[1]. Pape argues that suicide terrorism follows three features – timing, national goals and target selection – consistent with their strategy of coercion to compel a targeted government to change policy [3], specifically the withdrawal of military forces from territories that the terrorists consider to be their homeland[1,7]. Hence he exhibits a rational strategy using suicide bombing as a mean to implement this strategy, although such behavior from the prospective of a unique human being standpoint may be seen as irrational, which is basically the foundation of the arguments from the scholars, like Livingston in 1978, believing in the suicide terrorists are irrational and mentally ill[6], or Kramer, Merari or Post who focused on the irrationality of the act of suicide from the perspective of the individual attacker from individual motives perspective, either religious or indoctrination [3], in the ninety's, post 1980 "modern" suicide terrorism era starting point.

Testing such assumption is important in terms of counter-terrorism activities to focus on what is the most important in order to allocate human, political and material resources, time and budget efficiently and effectively. If this assumption is valid and ranked high enough among other valid hypothesis, then moving forward into a deeper analysis and implementing local or global policies

is worthwhile. However, if the assumption doesn't appear after an initial think-tank analysis as, as significant or not as high priority as more promising other investigative theories, then it's also worthwhile to know this result beforehand to drop it, deprioritize it or even postpone it.

Although before Pape's studies suicide terrorism was considered as crazy, the tendency seems to have changed as a result of "Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" published in 2005[5]. Pape's study[7] is based on his personal exhaustive collection and analysis of suicide terrorist incidents between 1980 and 2004 gathered in the original language as, Arabic, Hebrew, Russia, Tamil from the West Bank, Israel, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Kashmir to name a few. An interesting anecdote tends to show that the Palestinians got the idea of suicide vest from the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 by the Tamil Tigers.

Even though "suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation and not Islamic fundamentalism"[7] in more than 95% of Pape's studied cases, being selected by the Hamas' Al-Qassam to conduct a suicide attack is "embarking on this journey of honor", with "hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent on suicide missions"[2]. Although suicide seems to be forbidden in Islam, martyrdom is not, hence promoting suicide as a mean to reach this ultimate state: "use of suicide by Muslim terrorists that is being justified as *halal* (legitimate) acts of *shahada* (martyrdom) in the name of the *din* (faith)."[8].

To summarize, we have seen that tangible field studies do exist aiming at concluding that suicide terrorist are rational and not crazy, targeting political objectives in regard of territories occupation. This strategy has been mainly used by secular groups and has currently been adopted by modern religious-oriented terrorist organizations as a major tool to fight foreign occupancy and besides as an act of faith.

Consequently, I would label this assumption as true: the suicide terrorists are rational actors.

To go beyond, toward counter-terrorism policies, further investigations might be interesting into two directions, at least:

- since in 95% of the cases the suicide attacks[7] were concluded as fighting foreign occupancy, revisiting the assumption *religious-inspired terrorism* into *ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism* [9] may shed new light and bring new opportunities for the policy makers to refocus
- since suicide is justifiable as an act of faithful martyrdom, although suicide appears to be forbidden[8] by the three main religions, scholars, theologians and philosophers may want to revisit this statement aiming at providing alternative interpretation and education

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